Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable, then all social choice functions can be implemented in strictly dominant strategies by a mechanism which does not use “integer/modulo games”. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation in the two-person case, and describe some implications of these characterization conditions.     

The Competitive Effects of Price-Floors

Using Hotelling's model of locational competition, we show that a moderate price-floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium, resulting in minimum differentiation. Equilibrium prices are lower than prices in the absence of a floor. A low price-floor can lead to multiple equilibria, with both minimum and maximum differentiation as possible outcomes.     

Re-examining the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid: does political stability matter?

While past studies had conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of foreign aid on growth and development of a nation, recent studies have tried to delve deeper into the question, ‘what makes aid work?’ (see, Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson, 2013; Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; Svensson, 1999). This paper tests how political stability (vis-à-vis political instability) affects the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid. Applying dynamic panel estimators, our results show that political stability affects aid’s effectiveness on domestic capital formation. The paper considers alternative measures of political stability (vis-à-vis instability), focusing on the political characteristics of a system that have the potential to make a nation stable. Political stability affects policy selection by the government positively and, thus, public resources such as foreign aid are put to the desired use. The estimated marginal impacts show that foreign aid enhances domestic investment in the presence of a stable political climate, but there is a diminishing return to aid.     

India's development in the era of growth

The recent growth pattern of India is set in the context ofthe parallel experience of China, the experience of povertyreduction is reviewed, and a number of papers illuminating India'sdevelopment are introduced.     

Income distribution and income dynamics in the United Kingdom

In this paper, we propose a model of income dynamics which takes account of mobility both within and between jobs. The model is a hybrid of the mover‐stayer model of income dynamics and a geometric random walk. In any period, individuals face a discrete probability of ‘moving’, in which case their income is a random drawn from a stationary recurrent distribution. Otherwise, they ‘stay’ and incomes follow a geometric random walk. The model is estimated on income transition data for the United Kingdom from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and provides a good explanation of observed non‐linearities in income dynamics. The steady‐state distribution of the model provides a good fit for the observed, cross‐sectional distribution of earnings. We also evaluate the impact of tertiary education on income transitions and on the long‐run distribution of incomes. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Survival and the art of profit maximization

We study the relationship between rationality and economic survival in a simple dynamic model, where agents from different populations interact repeatedly through random matching. An explicit criterion (“bankruptcy”) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are presumed to be aware of this criterion. Survival in each interaction depends on two factors: the strategies agents adopt when they interact, and the wealth levels they bring to the game. The model is completely symmetric with the only difference between the agents of different populations being their objectives. We consider the case where there are two populations of agents in which all agents from one group have as their objective, maximizing the expected profits from each interaction, while all agents from the other attempt simply to maximize the probability of surviving (i.e., not going bankrupt in) the interaction. We show that under the equilibrium dynamics, the proportions of each group in the total population must be bounded away from zero, but the balance is in favor of the survival-probability maximizers in that their numbers as a fraction of total population must always exceed 1/2, and can be arbitrarily close to unity. On the other hand, the fraction of total wealth controlled by the expected profit maximizers must also be at least 1/2, and can asymptotically tend to unity.     

The evolution of growth intentions: Toward a cognition-based model

This research examines the relationship between growth intentions, cognitive style, and perceived competitive conditions, with a focus on whether and why intentions change over time. Drawing on qualitative data from a sample of 30 entrepreneurs over a five-year span, we find that entrepreneurs' cognitive style moderates the relationship between perceptions of the competitive environment and growth intentions. Entrepreneurs with differing cognitive styles vary in their approaches toward formulating and revising growth intentions. Relative to analytic entrepreneurs that exhibit greater stability in their intentions, holistic entrepreneurs are prone to greater variations in growth intentions. The findings have implications for future research, practice, public policy, and entrepreneurship training and development.     

Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems

This paper analyses the sustainability of inter-generational transfers in Samuelson's consumption-loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events. We find that with mild informational constraints, transfers cannot be supported by pure-strategy equilibria. Mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information, so that a version of the Folk theorem holds. However, these equilibria are not robust. If each agent's utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in Harsanyi (1973), these mixed strategy equilibria unravel, and only the zero-transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome. This result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified.     

Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology

After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovation that leads to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogenously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low-quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high-quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the "incumbency inertia" hypothesis.